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Revisiting Generality in Biology:  
Systems Biology and the Quest for Design Principles 
Sara Green1 
Abstract 
Due to the variation, contingency and complexity of living systems, biology is often taken to be a 
science without fundamental theories, laws or general principles. I revisit this question in light of 
the quest for design principles in systems biology and show that different views can be reconciled if 
we distinguish between different types of generality. The philosophical literature has primarily 
focused on (the lack of) generality of specific models or explanations, or on the heuristic role of 
abstraction. This paper takes a different approach in emphasizing a theory-constituting role of 
general principles. Design principles signify general dependency-relations between structures and 
functions, given a set of formally defined constraints. I contend that design principles increase our 
understanding of living systems by relating specific models to general types. The categorization of 
types is based on a delineation of the scope of biological possibilities, which serves to identify and 
define the generic features of classes of systems. To characterize the basis for general principles 
through generic abstraction and reasoning about possibility spaces, I coin the term constraint-based 
generality. I show that constraint-based generality is distinct from other types of generality in 
biology, and argue that general principles play a unifying role does not entail theory reduction. 
Keywords: Design Principles; Systems Biology; Unification; Biological laws; Constraints; Generic 
abstraction 
 
1. Is there room for generality in biology? 
Could there be a role for laws and general principles in biology? For many philosophers and 
biologists the answer seems to be no. Burian, Richardson and Van der Steen (1996) observe that in 
biology we do not find fundamental laws or theories but loosely interconnected explanations and 
concepts that acquire meaning in local historical and scientific contexts.2 Whereas their statement is 
based on observations of the prominent features of mainstream biology, some go further in stating 
principled arguments against the possibility of laws in biology. The strongest position takes biology 
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   Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection and principles of divergence may be an exception, since 
modeling of evolution resembles the attempt to treat biological processes as influenced by deeper laws (Depew and 
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extent to which natural selection determines the direction of evolution, the dynamics and unit of natural selection, and 
the heuristic and explanatory value of adaptationism (Amundson 1994, Green 2014).  
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to be nomically inhibited due to the contingency and variation of living systems. This position holds 
that no general law or principle could be universally applicable to the biological domain (Beatty 
1995, Mayr 2005, Smart 1963).  
Smart (1963) for instance argues that biological systems do not display the kind of regularity and 
uniformity that general theories and laws require. Similarly, Beatty (1995, 46-47) claims that “All 
generalizations about the living world: (a) are just mathematical, physical, or chemical 
generalizations (or deductive consequences of mathematical, physical, or chemical generalizations 
plus initial conditions) or (b) are distinctively biological, in which case they describe contingent 
outcomes of evolution”. In Beatty’s view, (a) presupposes an unacceptable form of reduction of 
biological structures to physical ones, whereas (b) is restricted by the high degree of 
nonhomogeneous outcomes of evolution. The apparent lack of generalization is not taken to 
diminish the scientific status of biology but rather to cement the autonomy of biology as a separate 
discipline. For instance, the fact that entities like genes lack an ‘essence’ has been used as an 
argument against reduction of biological explanations to physicochemical principles (Dupré 2007, 
Winther 2009).  
Not everything in biology is equally contingent, though. Examples of general molecular features are 
the genetic code, protein-signaling cascades, and the universality of ATP as an energy source. 
Biologists often draw on rather general theories like cell theory or on law-like equations 
representing e.g. statistical regularities in population genetics, kinetic regularities in Michaelis-
Menten rate laws, or formalized predator-prey relationships like the classical Lotka-Volterra model. 
Functional relations are sometimes described through abstract models. Examples are negative 
feedback control for homeostasis, amplifying control mechanisms, or the influential Hudgkin-
Huxley model of action potentials in neurons that treat excitable cells like electrical components. 
Recently, tools from graph theory have been used in systems biology to investigate general 
organizational relations in regulatory networks. Such examples raise the question why some 
relations are generalizable across many specific cases in biology (see also Hamilton 2007). 
This paper challenges the view that there could be no role for laws and general principles in 
biology. Yet, I argue that we need not assume any connection between general principles and a 
form of reductionism that threatens the autonomy of biology. These views can be reconciled if we 
distinguish between different types of generality and clarify the purposes for which biologists 
generalize. Rather than focusing on possible discrepancies between necessary and sufficient 
conditions for laws and biological cases, my aim is to explore why some life scientists seek general 
principles. I first distinguish between different types of generality and focus in particular on what I 
shall call constraint-based generality (Section 1.1). This type of generality will be illustrated 
through examples of design principles3 from systems biology (Section 2), and reflections on 
constraint-based generality in evolution (Section 3). Section 4 argues that principles based on 
constraint-based generality play a regulative and unifying role that is distinct from theory reduction. 
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.  
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1.1. Different types of generality 
As a framework for discussing the role(s) of general principles in systems biology I distinguish 
between different (orthogonal but non-exclusive) types of generality. These are classified into two 
main classes based on the distinctive roles they play in the reasoning practices and on the sources of 
the generalizations (Box 1).  
 
The first class contains generalizations based on material homogeneity or causal regularities. These 
are inferred through observations of similar causal patterns in concrete causal interactions. What I 
call Building-block generality stems from the material homogeneity and causal regularities of a 
physical system. This type of generality is typically taken to be limited in biology because 
biological systems form diverse and complex macrostructures organized in a variety of ways. Still, 
we may expect some regularity in biological traits due to conservative evolution because new 
organisms evolve from their predecessor through inherited material (DNA, membranes etc.). The 
universality of the genetic code, for instance, is typically explained with reference to common 
descent of all life forms. Other generalizations focus on functions rather than material similarities. 
Common traits observed across lineages may be the effects of convergent evolution. That is, natural 
selection promotes and preserves traits that are particularly well-adapted to particular types of 
environments in different species, such as wings for flying in bats and birds.  
 
 
 
As mentioned, the scope of generality has been taken to be highly restricted in biology due to the 
contingency of evolution and the variation of organisms. This claim is, however, tied to a focus on 
the generality of specific features whereas I claim that there are more dimensions to generality. 
First, generality in the practice of biological research does not necessarily rely on complete 
uniformity of causal relations. Generalizations may be based on a subset of causal similarities, e.g. 
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when a regulatory circuit in a model organism represents similar interactions in other target 
systems, or when biologists discuss general adaptive strategies. Second, rejecting generality based 
on causal regularities should not lead to the dismissal of generality in biology altogether. I shall 
argue that a different type of generalization goes beyond similarities of cause and effect in serving 
to abstractly delineate a possibility space for any system of a particular type.  
 
Researchers sometimes abstract from causal processes of specific systems to investigate why a 
causally diverse set of systems displays a similar behavior. What I call constraint-based generality 
refers to abstract principles that define the generic features of a class of systems that operates under 
a similar set of constraints. Key to this type of generality is that common patterns may not be 
observed due to causal uniformity, or a drive towards specific optimal traits, but due to constraints 
on the possibilities for the systems to instantiate other configurations or behaviors. The question of 
why a set of systems shares certain features is in this context not answered through reference to 
material homogeneity or evolutionary processes but through formalized dependency-relations. Such 
relations stem from constraints on the possible stable states, the possible functional relations, or the 
possible evolutionary trajectories of a class of systems. Thus, the inference made is from general 
constraints to possibility spaces and dependency-relations that, as a result, must hold for specific 
cases. 
 
The different types of generality are not exclusive, but I am distinguishing them because of the 
distinctive role they play in the reasoning practices of the scientists. Even if in particular cases of 
constraint-based generalities are products of conservative processes or natural selection, researchers 
may analyze these systems with different questions in mind. Importantly, the consideration of what 
relations are possible for a given type of system is distinct from questions about the causal 
operations in, or origin of, a specific system. In informing about possibility spaces, constraint-based 
generality goes beyond generalization from specific features to general cases. To make this type of 
generality clearer, the following section elaborates on the notions of constraint and generic 
abstraction.  
 
1.2. Constraints in biology and generic abstraction 
Constraints refer to conditions that at the same time limit and afford a certain scope of possible 
structures and functions that can be instantiated in a system of a particular type. Constraints do not 
explain how a phenomenon is produced by a mechanism in virtue of the	   interactions between 
component parts but rather denote the boundaries of such processes through reasoning about spaces 
of possibilities. Biological systems operate within different types of constraints, such as physical 
(mechanical and thermodynamic), structural (or organizational), functional, and developmental.4 To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Developmental constraints refer to features that set the boundaries for possible processes in embryonic stages. For 
instance, developmental constraints are taken to explain the lack of variation in the number of cervical vertebrae or five-
digit limbs among vertebrate species because the embryonic stages in the production of these cannot be altered without 
affecting other developmental processes. For an analysis of the historical role of developmental constraints in biology, 
see Brigandt (2015).  
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understand how the interplay of constraints both limits and affords a certain scope of possibilities, 
consider the implications of the rigid skeleton of vertebrates. Having a rigid skeleton limits the 
functional flexibility of body parts but also enables upright movement on land. The significance of 
such forms is greatly influenced by the physical constraints of the environment. For instance, a rigid 
skeleton has different significance in aquatic environments due to the density of the medium. In this 
interplay of constraints, the size of the organism matters too. Gravity is a major constraint for large 
organisms but only a weak force in the world of insects and microorganisms (Gould 1977/2006). 
For animals with a high surface-to-volume ratio, the world is instead dominated by surface forces 
that define a different space of possibilities.  
Reasoning about constraints not only plays an important role by imposing boundary conditions for 
research on specific functions but also helps biologists understand why certain functional or 
organizational patterns are common or absent in nature. The diversity of biology reflects a variety 
of evolutionary strategies for dealing with specific constraints while adapting to new environments. 
Yet, considering similarities of life forms from a more abstract perspective, there are general 
relations that become comprehensible through reasoning about constraints. Consider for instance 
the general relation between size and shape. As organisms grow larger, the relations between 
volume, surface area and weight grow disproportionally. Already Galilei (Discorsi, 1638) provided 
a mathematical scaling argument for the disproportionate relation between the thickness of bone 
structures and animal size: the strength of a given material depends upon the area of its cross-
section, but the weight of the animal increases with the cube of its length. This general relation 
places restrictions on the possible “designs” in biology and beyond. Gould (1977/2006) exemplifies 
how medieval churches cannot be up-scaled without adding intermediate support to the ceiling or 
narrowing the building. Reasoning about constraints is therefore of practical relevance for design in 
engineering and synthetic biology, and of theoretic relevance for biologists when identifying 
possibilities for biological variation.  
Constraints are often taken to play a purely negative role in biology. In the naïve adaptationist 
framework, traits develop towards optimal solutions via natural selection promoting beneficial 
functional variants while physical and developmental constraints only play a limiting role on the 
variation that selection can act on. In contrast, developmental biologists have brought attention to 
how constraints also afford the production of stable phenotypes by dampening the effects of 
environmental or genetic perturbations (Amundson 1994, Collins et al. 2007). For instance, the gap 
gene system responsible for segment development in Drosophila melanogaster has a regulatory 
structure (a double negative feedback loop) where two important genes repress each other’s 
transcription. The configuration, called a bi-stable toggle switch (Tyson et al. 2003), supports the 
stability of two mutually exclusive gene-expression patterns over a variety of initial conditions 
(Jaeger and Crombach 2012). Thus, the regulatory structure at the same time limits and affords the 
space of stable states. Moreover, the abstract formulation of the double negative feedback loop 
allows biologists to relate specific regulatory circuits with this configuration to a broader functional 
class of ‘toggle switches’ (Section 2).  
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The investigation of the stabilizing aspect of constraints in biology was pioneered by theoretical 
biologists such as Stuart Kauffman and Brian Goodwin. Kauffman (1969, 1993) modeled random 
Boolean networks to investigate how the structure of gene regulatory networks constrains the 
possible network states. The nodes in Kauffman’s networks represent N genes in different states 
(ON/OFF), determined by inputs from other genes. The state of the network is modeled as an 
ensemble of Boolean functions, based on K inputs, over time. Kauffman shows that despite the 
complexity of such networks, the number of sequences (or cycles) of states are rather low and the 
system converges to a limited number of stable states (attractors).5 Kauffman argues that constraints 
on the degrees of freedom for possible system states provide ‘order for free’ in the sense that the 
production of stable patterns is independent of selection mechanisms. Yet, self-organizing processes 
complement selection by affording stable variants on which selection may act (Goodwin 2009, 
Jaeger and Crombach 2012, Kauffman 1993). Theoretical approaches of this kind have so far had 
limited uptake in mainstream biology but this may change as systems biology can combine 
theoretical models and new biological data (Section 3). Moreover, constraints play an important 
role in biological reasoning and deservee more attention from philosophers. 
Biological reasoning often involves relating particular cases to general types. Some biologists may 
foremost be interested in explaining, for example, how a specific bat species echolocates. Yet, this 
investigation is informed by how the specific acoustic strategy relates to other, more general 
strategies, and how the specific strategies are influenced by physical and functional constraints. For 
instance, all strategies for sound emission in echolocating animals must operate within constraints 
pertaining to the relations between the directionality and frequency of sound beams and emitter size 
(Jakobsen 2010). Whereas generalizations about how such designs evolved, or how these are 
causally instantiated, depend on the specific historical and causal processes, the general relations 
are independent of such contingencies. For any sound emitter, the sound beam gets broader the 
lower the frequency is. At the most abstract level, the class of sound emitting systems may also 
involve engineered systems, which explains why the same formalized acoustic model can be 
applicable in both contexts. Because explanations of concrete systems are often taken to be the 
research aim in biology, the theoretical importance of reasoning about constraints in biology often 
remains unarticulated and unanalyzed. But many aspects of biological practice cannot be 
understood without considering these aspects. This holds in particular for research practices in 
systems biology that aim to identify generic features of system organization and formalize these as 
general ‘design principles’ (Section 2).  
Constraint-based generality makes possible the identification of general principles underpinning a 
class of systems exhibiting similar structural or dynamic patterns. I shall argue that general 
principles can play a unifying role in biological theorizing without entailing a reduction of the 
specific to the general. What is at stake is a type-classification via generic abstraction. I here draw 
on Nersessian’s (2008) analysis of how reasoning via generic abstraction was important for the 
work of Maxwell and Faraday. Generic abstraction involves “selectively suppressing information 
instantiated in a representation, so as to make inferences that pertain only to the generic case” 
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(Nersessian, 2008, p. 193). Thus, rather than focusing on causal similarities, generic abstraction 
distills what all sound emitters, triangles, harmonic oscillators, electromagnetic fields etc. have in 
common. The notion of generic features thus refers to relational properties that hold for a class of 
systems, regardless of their causal differences.  
Consider for instance the class of systems instantiating so-called Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions. 
In Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, concentric ring patterns of oscillating color are produced from a 
center through waves of oxidation propagating through a reduced medium. Such ring patterns are 
observed in chemical reactions where metal ions catalyze waves of oxidation of reductants by 
bromic acid. Similar structural patterns are also observed in some biological systems, e.g. in media 
for cAMP excreting slime mold amoebae under stress conditions (Goodwin 1994). Although the 
systems and substrates differ, the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction serves as a functional model in 
biology as well as in chemistry. It denotes a common non-equilibrium dynamic behavior of spatial 
and temporal symmetry breaking for the same type of excitable medium under the influence of 
stimuli (Shanks 2001). Regardless of the specific chemical components of the system, what is 
common is that an oxidative agent diffuses ahead of the wave front while reactions occur which 
inhibit the production of this chemical. This leaves a reduced medium in a refractory state behind 
the rings of wave fronts, and results in colored ring patters.  
The general features in such examples are not the properties of specific components but the 
“relational order” among properties (Goodwin 1994). Thus, the generality of such principles does 
not result from a uniformity of molecular building blocks and causal homogeneities in nature. 
Rather, dynamic patterns become visible through abstraction from the causal differences that do not 
matter for the pattern-forming relations. The following section further analyses this role through an 
examination of the quest for design principles in systems biology.  
 
2. Systems biology and the quest for general principles  
Systems biology comprises diverse approaches. Whereas some view systems biology as a successor 
of genomics and molecular biology, others have emphasized the relation to theoretical engineering 
disciplines, systems theory or classical physiology. These two viewpoints are sometimes captured 
as the pragmatic and the systems-theoretic approach, respectively (O'Malley and Dupré 2005). I 
focus on the systems theoretic approach which aims to identify general principles of biological 
organization. To justify the claim about the importance of such principles and clarify their role in 
biological theorizing, I have compiled a list of examples in Table 1. The principles are grouped 
according to the concepts used by scientists (higher order laws, design principles etc.) and the lines 
of research associated with these (General System Theory, systems biology etc.). I stress some 
important characteristics of these and analyze a few examples in further detail.  
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Description and field Examples of general principles References 
Higher Order Laws/ 
Isomorphic principles 
 
 
General System Theory  
Allometric scaling relations 
Exponential equation (growth/decay) 
Logistic law 
Growth equations 
Principles of open systems 
Bertalanffy (1967, 1969) 
 
Optimality principles 
 
 
Design principles 
 
 
 
 
Evolutionary Design Principles 
 
Cybernetics/Systems Theory 
(Evolutionary) Systems Biology 
Branching angle in vascular systems 
Demand Theory of gene regulation 
 
Network motifs 
Bi-stable switching 
Robustness, modularity 
Integral feedback control  
 
Principles underpinning common 
trajectories of evolutionary change, 
leading to design principles 
Rashevsky (1961), Rosen (1967) 
Savageau (1989) 
 
Alon (2007) 
Tyson, Chen and Novak (2003) 
Csete and Doyle (2002), Velazquez 
(2009); Yi et al. (2000) 
 
Soyer, ed. (2012) 
Organizing principles 
 
 
 
Cybernetics/Mathematical 
General Systems Theory/ 
Systems Biology 
Feedback underlying regulation, control 
and adaptation of dynamical systems 
Bounded Autonomy of Levels 
Closure to efficient causation 
 
Coordination principle 
Principles of tissue organization 
Wiener (1948), Mesarović et al. 2004 
 
Mesarović and Takahara (1975) 
Rosen (1991), Letelier et al. (2001) 
Hofmeyr (2007) 
Wolkenhauer and Hofmeyr (2007) 
Wolkenhauer et al. (2011) 
Table 1 Examples of general principles in biology.  
 
The quest for design principles has historical precursors in so-called higher-order laws in the 
framework of General System Theory, where Bertalanffy aimed to identify features that all systems 
of a particular type have in common (Bertalanffy 1969, Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). Bertalanffy 
wanted to understand why causally different systems can often be described via the same general 
models or equations. For instance, the logistic law of Verhulst can be used in physical chemistry to 
describe autocatalytic reactions, in population studies to capture population growth, or in sociology 
to characterize the growth and spread of technologies. The s-shaped sigmoid curve generated by the 
equation describes the generic features shared by the different processes: an initial exponential 
increase in elements that at a certain point becomes limited due to external constraints or limited 
resources. At the level of causal explanations we need to specify the causal make-up and operations 
of these systems which limits the generality of the explanations. But to answer Bertalanffy’s 
question, one must abstract from these differences to identify the basic features underpinning 
general patterns. Other examples are allometric scaling relations (e.g. between metabolic rate and 
body mass), growth equations for different metabolic types, and formalizations with cross-
disciplinary applicability such as equations describing flows of energy and heat, equilibrium models 
in chemical systems or populations etc.  
 
Some approaches compare living systems to well-functioning engineered systems to identify so-
called optimality principles. Examples are the discovery of the general ‘optimal’ branching angle in 
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vascular systems inspired by the designs of pipe systems that minimize the flow of resistance 
(Rashevsky 1961, Rosen 1967), and Savageau’s demand theory for optimal gene regulation 
(Savageau 1989). Engineering approaches have recently had a renaissance with the application of 
graph theoretical tools to biological datasets. In systems biology such principles are typically 
referred to as design principles. These need not focus on optimal performance but are 
organizational rules “that underlie what networks can achieve particular biological functions” (Ma 
et al. 2009, 260).  
 
Examples of design principles are the previously mentioned bi-stable toggle switch (Tyson et al. 
2003) and Alon’s (2007) discovery of a set of network motifs, i.e. frequently occurring circuits in 
transcriptional regulatory networks (Figure 1). The organizational structure of the circuits are taken 
to constrain (in an enabling and limiting sense) the possible regulatory functions performed by the 
circuit. For instance, regulatory systems with the Feedforward loop (FFL) structure are understood 
as persistence detectors for noisy input signals. This function was demonstrated mathematically for 
the general case (note the lack of details about the nodes in Figure 1), and the motif was 
experimentally confirmed to perform this function in metabolic regulation in E. coli (Alon, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 1 Examples of Alon’s network motifs (see text).   
Design principles signify the hope that functions in biology, as in engineering, are supported by 
general design principles that are independent of specific contexts of implementation. The 
formalization of such principles serves an important role in identifying organizational features that 
in general will support behaviors such as sustained oscillations, amplified signals, homeostasis etc. 
Accordingly, the same cybernetic model can facilitate reasoning in several contexts. For instance, 
negative feedback control is a central principle in mechanical and electronic engineering to 
maintain stable states, minimize fluctuations and create oscillatory behaviors, and is also 
widespread in biological systems. The same formalization – defining negative feedback as 
inhibition of a reaction as a result of accumulation of the product of the same reaction - can be 
applied in both domains (Wiener 1948).  
Further down the list in Table 1 we find the notion of evolutionary design principles. Some systems 
biologists refer to natural selection when reflecting on the origin of design principles such as 
network motifs (e.g., Alon 2007).6 Yet, evolutionary design principles typically refer more broadly 
to generic features (adaptive or non-adaptive) underpinning evolutionary trajectories that lead to 
common patterns of network organization or morphology (Soyer 2012, ed., see Section 3). In Table 
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1, I have listed organizing principles as a category separate from design principles because this 
notion is preferred by some systems biologists to emphasize what is characteristic for living 
systems only (Mesarović and Takahara 1970, 1975, Wolkenhauer and Hofmeyr 2007).7 I shall focus 
mainly on design principles in this paper but the lessons drawn holds for all of the abovementioned 
types of general principles.  
General principles provide an understanding of the generic features that enable causally different 
systems to produce a similar pattern under a range of implementations. General principles do not 
stand in a direct representational relationship to specific causal systems, but rather abstract from 
causal differences to identify common relational properties among members of a given class of 
systems. In the words of the systems biologists Ma el al. (2009, 760), the hope is that “Despite the 
diversity of possible biochemical networks, it may be common to find that only a finite set of core 
topologies can execute a particular function. These design rules provide a framework for 
functionally classifying complex natural networks and a manual for engineering networks” (my 
emphasis). Similarly, Wolkenhauer, Shibata and Mesarović (2012, 59-60) state that: “An organizing 
principle in this context specifies a category of systems to which a model belongs to; it describes an 
essential characteristic feature, a rule or law of which the function identified is an instantiation” 
(my emphasis). The general categories can be identified through discoveries of common 
organizational patterns (as in Alon’s discovery of frequent network motifs) or through a rigorous 
mathematical analysis of the constraints that any possible mechanistic model of the type of system 
must obey. The examples in the following exemplify the latter where a biological property 
(robustness) is articulated as mathematical constraints on possibility spaces.  
 
2.1. Design principles for robustness  
The emphasis on design principles is particularly prominent in research on biological robustness, 
i.e. the capacity for a biological system to maintain a given function across a range of perturbations 
to internal and external conditions (Kitano 2007). Since robustness is also an engineering goal, 
mathematical tools from control theory are increasingly used to investigate whether design 
principles underpinning robustness in the two contexts are similar, and to determine the relative 
dependency of the capacity on fine-tuned mechanisms. Strikingly, many instances of biological 
robustness appear to result from characteristic ways in which the system is organized (Stelling et al. 
2004). This motivates attempting to identify organizational schemes that in general afford 
robustness.  
An example is Shinar and Feinberg’s (2010, 2011) robustness theorem. Theorem proving is 
typically not associated with the life sciences but is sometimes used in systems biology to explore 
the range of logically feasible models for a given property. Shinar and Feinberg (2011) distinguish 
“designs that work” from “designs that cannot work” by showing mathematically how various 
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notions of design and organizing principles are often used interchangeably and have overlapping historical precursors 
(Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). 
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network designs can or cannot support the capacity of biochemical reaction networks to display 
absolute concentration robustness (ACR) for a biochemical species against variations in the 
concentrations of constituents. Shinar and Feinberg draw on Chemical Reaction Network Theory to 
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for ACR. Their mathematical robustness theorem 
demonstrates that any biochemical mass-action network displays ACR if i) the deficiency of the 
network is one and ii) two non-terminal nodes differ only in one biochemical species. Deficiency is 
here a measure of the interdependency of the reactions in the network, calculated by subtracting the 
linkage class (the number of mutually linked nodes in the reaction diagram) and the rank of the 
reaction network (the number of linearly independent reactions) from the number of network nodes.  
These measures are context-independent in the sense that they are stated in general terms for all 
networks sharing the formally defined set of properties.  
 
What is striking about the result is that the conditions for ACR are expected to hold regardless of 
the size and the specific biochemical interactions in such networks. The results thus define the 
properties that any system belonging to a particular category must share and provide understanding 
as to why particular designs can or cannot be expected to be found in systems with a given capacity 
(see also Wolkenhauer et al. 2012). Importantly, this type of analysis operates on a meta-level in 
relation to mechanistic network models, and the analysis explores possibilities beyond what may be 
biological realized in any concrete system. Accordingly, the aim of the theorem is not a mechanistic 
explanation but a principle stating a dependency-relation between formally defined structural 
features of networks and their functional properties. Even though the proof rests on some idealizing 
assumptions about biochemical networks, it points to crucial architectural features of network 
robustness that are observed in bacteria (Shinar and Feinberg 2011).  
 
To clarify further the difference between causal explanations of specific systems and design 
principles,consider a theoretical approach to robustness of sensory adaptation in bacterial 
chemotaxis. Bacterial chemotaxis is the strategy by which bacteria can “swim” toward attractants 
and away from repellants. Is has been shown experimentally that the system of sensor and flagella 
motor display so-called ‘robust perfect adaptation’ (RPA) where the sensitivity of sensors to new 
stimuli remains stable over a wide range of parameters (Alon et al. 1999). Expressed in engineering 
terms, perfect adaptation (or perfect desensitization) is the capacity of a system to maintain the 
responsiveness of sensors by returning to the exact pre-stimulus value. In bacterial chemotaxis, the 
tumbling frequency responds to changes in stimulus level but then adapts to the new level and 
returns to its steady-state value through reactivation of the receptor. This enables the system to 
maintain sensitivity to new changes. The capacity of perfect adaptation is robust over a wide range 
of stimulus levels and system parameters, and researchers are interested in understanding how this 
is possible. Two quite different research questions can be asked in this connection. One concerns 
how RPA is causally produced through interactions among the components in the receptor complex. 
The other, which I stress here, concerns what principles in general underpin RPA (see also Braillard 
2010).  
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The molecular mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis are well-known, as are mechanisms 
underlying the adaptation to concentrations of attractants and repellants.8 Barkai and Leibler (1997) 
developed a model of the receptor complex consisting of a set of differential equations capturing the 
dynamics of all individual biochemical species through methylation-demethylation processes. 
Simulations based on this model show that the system does not require specific parameter values for 
enzyme concentration or kinetic rate constants, and Barkai and Leibler therefore propose that the 
robustness of the system may be due to intrinsic (topological) properties of the signaling network. 
John Doyle and colleagues take a rigorous mathematical approach to this question by investigating 
whether a central principle for RPA in control theory also underpins bacterial chemotaxis.  
When designing systems that asymptotically track a fixed steady-state value, engineers rely on the 
principle of integral feedback control (Figure 2). When environmental inputs u change, the 
difference between the actual output (y1) and the desired output (y0: steady-state receptor activity) is 
fed back into the system as the integral of the system error -x, which becomes an action signal for 
returning to the pre-stimulus value. By accounting for the difference between y1 and y0, the system 
normalizes the reaction to input u to output y, to maintain the gain k. 
 
Figure 2. Diagram illustrating integral feedback control. See text for details. Source: Yi TM, Huang Y, Simon MI, 
Doyle J (2000) Robust perfect adaptation in bacterial chemotaxis through integral feedback control. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
U S A 97:4649-4653. Copyright (2000) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A. 
Doyle and colleagues reinterpret the Barkai-Leibler model in the framework of control theory and 
derive an equation characteristic of integral feedback control from the Barkai-Leibler model. The 
equation guarantees that there is no dependence on the level of the chemoattractant if certain 
assumptions are satisfied. The mathematical rigor allows the researchers to systematically examine 
the importance of various model assumptions and demonstrate that four of these are sufficient to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In E.coli, chemotaxis involves mediation of a kinase-phosphorylation signal transduction pathway from methyl-
accepting transmembrane receptors to six Che proteins that interact with a flagella motor that can change the tumbling 
frequency according to input signals. Adaptation to concentration of repellants and attractors is causally instantiated by 
ligand binding, methylation and demethylation of receptors. 
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ensure RPA (Yi et al. 2002).9 Moreover, they show how relaxation of any of these leads to non-
robust dynamics or deviation from perfect adaptation and the assumptions are therefore considered 
necessary features of the Barkai-Leibler model.  
Could integral feedback control be said to be a design principle for any system with the functional 
capacity of RPA? Doyle and colleagues argue that if a system has robust asymptotic tracking it 
must be linearized around a fixed ligand equilibrium that confers the conditions for integral 
feedback control (Yi et al. 2000). They prove this statement for linear systems and consider the 
result a special case of the internal model principle in control theory, stating that robust asymptotic 
adaptation requires an internal model of these signals to be present within the system (for proofs of 
IMP for nonlinear cases, see Sontag 2003). Integral feedback control thus provides a formal 
constraint on possible mechanistic models capturing the causal operation of chemotaxis in different 
systems. They argue that “if their [Barkai and Leibler] specific model is later found to be 
contradicted by experimental data, another mechanism implementing integral feedback is likely to 
be present” (Yi et al. 2000, 4652). Thus, any system found to display RPA can be expected to 
belong to the larger class of systems implementing integral feedback control.  
Organisms have often found ways to deal with constraints in ways that engineers find to be unlikely 
or even impossible, and some researchers are reluctant to claim that RPA necessarily entails 
integral control (Briat et al. 2014). Still, Briat et al. contends that integral control seems to be a 
generic feature of the known biological cases of perfect adaptation, including homeostasis of 
calcium in mammals and membrane turgor pressure in yeast.10 With the investigation of generic 
features, the focus shifts from uncovering specific causal mechanisms to investigating the types of 
system organization that in general can realize a particular function.  
Ma and colleagues (2009, 761) formulate this shift of focus explicitly: “Here, instead of focusing on 
one specific signaling system that shows adaptation, we ask a more general question: what are all 
network topologies that are capable of robust adaptation?” They address this question in the context 
of enzymatic regulatory networks by computationally searching all possible three-node networks to 
identify the ones performing RPA. Strikingly, only 395 out of 16.038 possible network topologies 
show of robust adaptation, and all robust designs display one of two core topologies; either a 
negative feedback loop with a buffer node (NFBLB) or an incoherent feedforward loop architecture 
(IFFLP). They further show that the NFBLB class, to which the bacterial chemotaxis system 
belongs, implies integral feedback control. While the IFFLP class may be an alternative principle 
accounting for RPA, contradicting Yi and colleagues general statement, the lack of clear biological 
cases where this principle is instantiated raise further questions about constraints on biological 
variation. Whether there are one or two general cases, the example highlights a type of analysis that 
serves to “unify the organization of diverse circuits across all organisms” (Ma et al. 2009, 760).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  These assumptions are:  i) CheB only demethylates active receptors, ii) The kinetic rate constants of CheR and CheB 
are independent of the methylation state of the receptor complex, iii) The activity of unmethylated receptors are 
negligible, and iv) The concentration of bound CheR is independent of ligand-level. 	  
 
10 For practical implications of this principle for designing synthetic homeostatic circuits in synthetic biology, see also 
(Ang et al. 2010).  
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I shall further analyze the philosophical implications of this unifying role in Section 4 where I also 
comment on the connection to non-mechanistic explanations. First, I respond to the possible 
objection that although some functional principles can be abstracted from specific causal models, 
there is little room for general laws or principles of evolution. Is the quest for general principles 
compatible with the common view of the contingency of evolution?  
  
3. Constraint-based generality in evolution 
The famous statement by Stephen Jay Gould (1982) that a “replayed tape” of evolution would yield 
a completely different outcome is often taken to support the view that biology can only be a 
historical science with highly context-dependent explanations. Yet, Gould’s work as a whole 
reminds us that there are different dimensions to generality. We therefore need to specify which 
features of biology we take to be general or context-dependent. Some research in evolutionary 
biology is focused on adaptive differences among species or populations, whereas other research 
aims to explain the generality of some phenotypic patterns. From the perspective of the first 
approach, evolution appears highly contingent in the sense that evolution can explore an infinite 
number of roads for adaptive specialization, making it highly unlikely that something like Homo 
sapiens would result from a rewound tape. But it does not follow that evolutionary roads - from a 
higher-level perspective - are random and exhibit unlimited degrees of freedom.  
Gould was just as fascinated by the common morphological patterns across phyla as by the diversity 
of species (Haufe 2015, Sterelny 2007). In this own words “[H]owever much we celebrate diversity 
and revel in the peculiarities of animals, we must also acknowledge a striking ‘lawfulness’ in the 
basic design of organisms” (Gould 1977/2006, 319). Gould saw this as evident in the general 
relations between size and shape, and in the limited variation in functional designs for respiration, 
flying etc. Whereas science fiction books often describe giant insects with current insect 
morphology scaled up, Gould cheerfully points out that the evolution of such organisms is not 
possible as “their sheer bulk would have grounded them permanently” because the weight that must 
be supported by the wings increases as the cube of the length (Gould 1977/2006, 321). Similarly, 
the combined effect of the law of gas diffusion and physiological requirements for gas exchange 
means that open respiratory designs can only support organisms with large surface-to-volume ratios 
(see also Wouters 2007). Insects are therefore constrained to be small. 
Reflections of this type are not just amusing intellectual exercises but also bring insights to whether 
the characteristic patterns result from conservative, convergent or constraint-based processes (or a 
combination of these). Gould (1983/2006) calls for a shift in focus from what he calls ‘vulgar 
Darwinism’; the attempt to analyze organisms ‘part by part’ from selectionist explanations of 
evolution towards adaptive endpoints. From the perspective of adaptationists, the endpoints signify 
‘good adaptive tricks’ that sometimes can be general, but the paths to get these are considered 
random (Dawkins 1978, Dennett 1995). Gould takes the opposite stand in viewing the specific 
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endpoints as largely contingent but the processes leading to these as constrained.11  Although the 
difference between these viewpoints are sources of many scientific controversies, paying attention 
to the level of abstraction in the two cases opens the possibility that they can be viewed as 
complementary focal points within the same theoretical framework (Gould 1977/1996, Green et al. 
2015a). While particular traits may be explained by adaptive specialization to specific types of 
environments, understanding the stability of dis-continuous phenotypic patterns in the larger 
landscape of possible phenotypes require something other than selectionist explanations (Wilkins 
and Godfrey-Smith 2009).12  
The adaptationist approach has been dominant after the modern synthesis, and the issue of 
constraints on form and morphological shapes has been taken up mainly by neo-Rationalists and 
developmental biologists. But the recent emergence of fields such as EvoDevo (Collins et al. 2007, 
Müller and Newman 2003) and evolutionary systems biology (ESB) (Soyer 2012, ed.) signifies a 
renewed interest in filling in the gap that Darwin described as our profound ignorance of the laws of 
variation (Darwin 1859, 167). In these fields, the quest for general principles of evolution is 
captured by notions such as ‘generic principles’, ‘generative principles’, ‘isomorphic principles’, or 
‘evolutionary design principles’. The principles are framed in different conceptual frameworks, but 
the common idea is that investigations of general constraints and principles of evolution can be 
informative about biological variation and stability of evolutionary trajectories.  
Evolutionary principles are called for to illuminate why some phenotypic patterns (leaf structures in 
plants, segment and stripe patterns in insects etc.) are general and discrete, rather than exhibiting 
continuous variation filling the scope of logical possibilities (Soyer, ed. 2012). Why, for instance, 
are only a small set of logically possible network motifs observed in regulatory networks? Are these 
the effects of selection? Or a by-product of genome evolution, obeying structural constraints, akin 
to the process Kauffman described? Or perhaps a combination? By mathematical and computational 
modeling of detailed experimental data, evolutionary systems biologists can now address such 
questions in novel ways. Evolutionary simulations can largely extend and complement experimental 
approaches by searching for evolutionary patterns across multiple levels of biological organization, 
allowing the researchers to focus on “evolutionary trajectories and transitions, rather than the 
substrates or end projects of natural selection” over a large time span (Jaeger and Crombach 2012, 
106). In particular, non-goal directed simulations have great potential for informing about the 
structural side effects of evolutionary dynamics and for outlining the range of possible future 
trajectories of the evolving in silico system (Hogeweg 2012).  
An example is Cordero and Hogeweg’s (2006) evolutionary network model that demonstrates how 
hierarchical structures with an overabundance of network motifs (feedforward loops) can emerge by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Whereas Gould initially believed that laws of evolution could be based on regular adaptive processes, he came to 
realize that generality in evolution was most likely to be found in evolutionary processes that are insensitive to specific 
adaptations and variations (Haufe 2015).  
12	  Huang (2004) refers to these different focal points as Type I and Type II explanations in evolutionary biology (the 
latter investigating what I call constraint-based generality).    
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non-selective tinkering of promoter regions in simulations of evolving yeast networks. The 
researchers use experimentally measured rates of mutational dynamics (deletion, mutation, 
duplication and recombination of genes and transcription-factor binding cites) in transcriptional 
regulatory networks of yeast and simulate the network evolution over 2000 generations. Due to the 
high degree of freedom in such a model, one might expect the network structure to evolve in a 
random fashion. But surprisingly well-organized patterns evolve in the model (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Generation of hierarchical network structures from mutational dynamics over 2000 generations. Cordero and 
Hogeweg (2006). Reprinted by permission from Oxford University Press. 
The white nodes in the network have the same connectivity-pattern as Alon’s FFL network motif 
(Section 2). These structural patterns were unexpected as the model does not select for functional 
motifs, and patterns shown in Figure 3 with many closely overlapping FFL structures were found to 
match empirical data for transcriptional networks in yeast (Cordero and Hogeweg 2006).13 The 
demonstration that non-random patterns can result from constraints on random mutational dynamics 
questions the assumption that the generality of organizational patterns, such as network motifs, 
could only be explained by natural selection.  
To extend the list of examples, the computational biologist and evolutionary theorist Eugine Koonin 
(2011) uses mathematical tools to search for “laws of evolution” in comparative studies of 
prokaryote and eukaryote genomes. As examples of such “universal” quantitative laws of evolution 
he mentions the negative correlation between a gene’s sequence evolution rate and expression level, 
and the distinct scaling of functional classes of genes with genome size. Similarly, the population 
geneticist Michael Lynch (personal communication) stresses the existence of a universal scaling 
between the number of genome-wide deleterious mutations and effective population size, where the 
latter plays a role akin to temperature in statistical mechanics. Thus, the quest for laws or principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  In the network model based on empirical data, they find that many of the motifs are closely overlapping and “more 
than 30% of the FFL circuits are formed by 5 pairs of regulators with significant homology at the protein level” 
(Cordero and Hogeweg 2006, 1934). This finding speaks counter to the assumptions that the motifs result from 
selection of individual functional units (see also Green, 2014).  
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of evolution need not rest upon the assumption that natural selection alone provides this regularity. 
Taken together, the cases stress the importance of answering questions related to the actual level of 
randomness in variation, and the level of contingency vs. generality for evolutionary trajectories 
and endpoints. 
 
4. How generic abstraction inform biological theorizing 
In this section we further examine the difference between i) generalizations based on causal 
similarities in specific systems, and ii) general principles that define the generic features of a 
typified class of systems. Whereas the former gain stability from empirical observation of causal 
homogeneities and regularities in nature, the latter play a theoretical role in categorizing general 
functional dependencies which specific systems of a given type must instantiate. Returning to the 
example of bacterial chemotaxis in Section 2, a mechanistic model of how RPA is causally 
produced can be generalized only if the causal operations are similar in other systems. In contrast, 
the principle of integral feedback control is taken to generically achieve RPA in any system 
exhibiting this functional capacity. The significance of the latter research aims is stated by Ma et al. 
(2009, 760) when highlighting that the aim to “construct a unified function-topology mapping that 
[…] may otherwise be obscured by the details of any specific pathway and organism”. Thus, we 
may miss out on important aspects of biological research practice if we insist on the focus on causal 
explanations of specific systems and take all generalizations to be based on these.  
The examples in this paper may been seen as instances of what philosophers of science recently 
have described as topological explanations (Huneman 2010, Jones 2014) or non-causal design 
explanations (Braillard 2010, Wouters 2007). These explanations identify functional dependencies 
that deliberately abstract from the causal basis for these properties in specific systems. My aim in 
this paper, however, is not to engage in a discussion about explanatory and non-explanatory features 
of design principles, but rather to highlight a theoretically important role of constraint-based 
reasoning that complement explanations of causal specifics.  
Asking how effects are causally produced is not the only important research question in biology. 
Researchers may also be interested in understanding the spaces of possibilities that biological 
systems must operate within, why certain patterns are observed in many (biological) systems, and 
why the same model applies to a set of systems despite differences in their causal make-up.14 
Design principles identify formal rules about what organizational structures can achieve a particular 
type of biological function. Formalizations are important for this purpose because they can highlight 
and clarify similarities of form regardless of materiel context (Griesemer 2012). Design principles 
thereby signify general dependency-relations between structures and functions, given a set of 
formally defined constraints. Research may either start from an investigation of organizational 
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accounts differ with respect to what is taken to be the salient feature of the answer to the why-question.  
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features to infer functional capacities (as in Kauffman’s or Alon’s work), or – as in the examples on 
robustness (Section 2) – start from a formally defined functional capacity to determine the 
organizational designs that will work. This way, design principles helps researchers to understand 
the particular cases as instantiations of a more general type, e.g., as an instance of amplifiers, 
feedback control systems, persistence detectors etc. As I shall further clarify below, they unify 
causally different systems through generic abstraction.  
 
4.1. Unification without reduction 
The role of formalizations in biology is sometimes taken to imply a reductive subsumption strategy. 
For instance, Winther (2009, 138) argues that the increasing use of abstract formalizations, e.g. in 
mathematical analysis of gene regulatory networks (GRN), has affinities with the aim of providing 
reducing theories. Winther contends that these explanatory functions are important aspects of 
theoretical biology and suggests that a mathematical model of a GRN can be seen as a mathematical 
reducing theory whereby qualitative phenotypic characteristics (e.g. tissue differentiation) are 
derived from and reduced to more general GRN models. Meanwhile, he acknowledges that the 
biological world may be too diverse to be adequately characterized by a global mathematical 
structure. I do not dispute that subsumption strategies may play a role in some biological contexts. 
Yet, the practice of systems biology shows that general principles can play a unifying role that is 
not realized through reduction.  
I have argued that general principles inform biological theorizing by establishing connections 
between higher-level descriptions of different systems and therefore unify these through generic 
abstraction. This role is akin to the one described by Kitcher:  
Understanding the phenomena is not simply a matter of reducing the ‘fundamental 
incomprehensibilities’ but of seeing connections, common patterns, in what initially 
appeared to be different situations. Science advances our understanding of nature by 
showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, using the same patterns of 
derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the 
number of types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or brute). (Kitcher 1989, 432) 
 
I share with Kitcher the view that a great part of scientific understanding relates to seeing and 
establishing connections and patterns across different contexts. The systems theoretic approach in 
biology is largely inspired by the attempt to search for unified schemas accounting for systems 
phenomena to counterbalance fragmentation in science (Bertalanffy 1969). But unlike Kitcher, I do 
not define scientific explanations solely in terms of deductive argument patterns. And unlike 
Friedman, I do not see unification as the “essence of scientific explanation” (Friedman 1974). 
Science is diverse and researchers have different explanatory and theoretical aims because there are 
different types of questions one may ask about the world. For the same reason, I am not claiming 
that constraint-based generality is equally important in all research fields of biology.  
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Importantly, general principles do not replace specific models. Specific models cannot be derived 
from or reduced to general principles. Neither can we get to insights about possibility spaces from 
detailed models of specific systems. They are simply answers to different questions. Whereas causal 
explanations specify how operations are produced in concrete systems, the abstract analysis 
highlights the functional dependencies that enable and limit the space of possibilities for the type of 
systems that the specific cases are instantiations of. Both types of insights are necessary if we want 
to understand not only the causal operations of concrete systems but also how these relate to other 
phenomena, and whether these relations could have been different. Also in evolutionary biology, 
these two explanatory strategies are compatible in the sense that a full explanation requires an 
uncovering of the “interplay between stable, predictable patterns (laws) and unpredictability of 
specific outcomes” (Koonin 2011, 5).  
 
The unifying role of formalizations in biology is akin to Kuhn’s (1962/1996) description of how 
exemplars guide science education and research by representing general solution to problems. In 
systems biology, a characteristic feature is that such exemplars are adopted from other disciplines 
such as physics and engineering.15 This observation may bring back Beatty’s (1995) worry that the 
generalizations are physical or chemical, rather than biological. Yet, reasoning about possibility 
spaces is conducted within a functional framework and also involves constraints which are 
distinctively biological. 
 
Physical constraints are important for understanding spaces of possibilities in biology. As Polanyi 
(1968) argued, the boundary conditions imposed on physico-chemical processes by the structure of 
biological systems is what enables the system to harness the functional utilization of these. But 
these are not explanatory in biology outside the functional context of the organism. Polanyi 
therefore argues that the controlling principles of life cannot be reduced to the laws of physics and 
chemistry. Similarly, contrary to the expected reconnection to reductionism, the quest for general 
principles in systems biology reflects a step towards a focus on relational or systemic properties 
(Klir 1991). Rather than stressing the reduction of biological complexity to physical principles, 
systems biologists emphasize that many biological properties are only visible when we understand 
living systems as functional wholes in interaction with their environment. From this perspective, the 
search for abstract principles may indicate an increasing awareness of our inability to understand 
how living systems function from a bottom-up study of components, or how these evolve without 
an understanding of the constraints on biological variation.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   I thank Mads Goddiksen for suggesting a comparison between the transfer of higher-order formalisms in systems 
biology and exemplars. One disadvantage of seeing design principles as examplars is, however, that it is not a part of 
Kuhn’s account to make sense of the redefinition of exemplars through interdisciplinary ‘bootstrapping’ (Nickles 1990, 
24).  
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5. Concluding remarks 
The philosophical literature on formalizations in biology has primarily focused on how inferences 
in a formalized model relate to inferences made about causal relations in a target system, or to 
derivations in reductive explanations. On this background, the possibility for general laws or 
principles in biology is dismissed due to the diversity and contingency of biological phenomena or 
as a result of a demonstration of the problems with theory reduction. I have argued that an 
examination of the scientific practice of systems biology challenges the view that there could be no 
role for laws and general principles in biology. Yet, I argue that we need not assume any connection 
between general principles and reductionism. Rather, the views can be reconciled if we distinguish 
between different types of generality. In particular, I have argued that constraint-based generality is 
compatible with the rejection of generality based on strong causal regularities in the biological 
world and even with the contingency of evolution.  
When scholars have argued that there is no room for generality in biology, they have typically 
addressed this question at a level where individual traits, organisms or molecular structures are 
compared. But a similar conclusion could be reached if we studied the behavior of individual 
molecules in a gas. In the context of physics and chemistry, the observation of various trajectories 
of individual molecules is perfectly compatible with the possibility of identifying common 
organizational patterns and laws if we treat these entities as ensembles of particles and pursue a 
higher-level analysis of their projected long-term states. Similarly, biological systems can be 
observationally and experimentally studied for purposes of identifying causal operations in specific 
systems or be treated as particles with common relational or dynamic properties that enable a 
categorization of biological possibilities and stable types (see also Haufe 2015). I have argued that 
the quest for general principles is compatible with the view that specific endpoints of evolution are 
highly contingent. The need to recognize these different and compatible approaches increases as 
researchers within systems biology reintroduce the quest for design principles through mathematical 
and computational modeling of biological ‘big data’. These research practices indicate a renewed 
interest in understanding how constraints on dynamic trajectories drive living systems towards 
particular equilibrium states, why some system-level properties are insensitive to many lower-level 
perturbations, and why characteristic patterns are observed across causally distinct systems. 
I have argued for a unifying role of general principles, exemplified through case studies in systems 
biology where researchers identify design principles. Design principles signify general dependency 
relations between biological structures and functions through formally defined constraints. The 
principles are identified by deliberately abstracting from causal details to identify the generic 
features that functionally equivalent systems (must) have in common. Although the empirical value 
of such general principles is dependent on specific systems instantiating the types of relations 
described, causal differences between the systems of the class are irrelevant to the formal rules 
signifying the generic systems properties. The epistemic power of such principles lies in this lack of 
context-dependency because it affords an understanding of why a set of systems behaves in a 
specific way independently of the particular manifestation of the functions. 
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Philosophers often associate the question about generality in biology with the question about theory 
reduction to physical laws or principles. I have argued that the current situation in systems biology 
gives no indication of theory reduction. General principles in systems biology are not derived from 
physical or chemical laws but are additional to these and specific for functional systems. Moreover, 
the formalization of general principles in systems biology is not introduced as an alternative to 
detailed causal explanations. General principles address a different type of question. Biologists may 
ask which network designs can possibly afford the type of robustness observed in biological 
systems, or why some logically possible phenotypic patterns are not realized in any real-world 
biological system. These conclusions cannot be reached by detailed modeling of the existing 
phenotypic traits alone. Thus, the quest for general principles highlight the wish to understand what 
generic features characterize pattern-producing systems in biology and beyond, and why we should 
expect particular organizational patterns to arise in evolution.  
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